E3 Remarks to the IAEA Board of Governors Regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, March 2023

Chair,

On behalf of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, I wish to extend our gratitude to Director General Grossi for his recent report, noted in GOV/2023/8, as well as to Deputy Director General Aparo for his Technical Briefing.

The E3 appreciates the Agency’s objective reporting on Iran’s nuclear programme and urges the Director General to keep the Board updated on all activities and developments that require clarification from Iran. We express our gratitude for the Agency’s dedicated and impartial work, particularly its inspections of Iran’s facilities.

It is noteworthy that after discussions between the Director General and Vice-President Eslami, a Joint Statement was made on 4 March, wherein Iran agreed “on a voluntary basis” to “allow the IAEA to implement further appropriate verification and monitoring activities.” Furthermore, in his report GOV/2023/8, the Director General mentioned that Iran has consented to facilitate an increase in the frequency and intensity of verification activities by the Agency.

We intend to hold Iran accountable for the prompt and comprehensive execution of these agreed actions, in light of the serious and increasingly alarming escalation of its nuclear programme. Such actions have further distanced Iran from its commitments made in 2015. The Director General reports that:

• Iran has continued to expand its stockpiles of 5%, 20%, and 60% enriched uranium to unprecedented levels. The stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which poses significant proliferation concerns, has now exceeded two IAEA significant quantities, beyond the amount from which the possibility of producing a nuclear explosive device cannot be dismissed.
• Iran continues to install new centrifuge cascades, including advanced models, in substantial quantities. We are particularly concerned about Iran’s announcements regarding the installation of additional advanced centrifuges and cascades at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which would dramatically enhance Iran’s enrichment capacity at this previously covert underground facility. There is no valid civilian rationale for Iran to operate an enrichment programme at Fordow, as the facility is not suitable for any meaningful civil enrichment activities.
• We also express our serious concerns regarding substantial work on uranium metal previously indicated, along with associated irreversible gains in critical knowledge. We urge Iran not to engage in any further activities related to uranium metal production. Additionally, a new issue has emerged concerning a discrepancy detected nearly a year ago between the natural uranium amount declared by Iran from JHL and that verified by the Agency. Iran must clarify this matter without delay.

The E3 are particularly alarmed by the recent sampling at Fordow, which detected HEU particles of uranium enriched to 83.7% U-235. This finding is significantly inconsistent with the enrichment level declared by Iran, which has yet to persuade us that this is due to its claimed ‘unintended fluctuations’. We call on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency and provide credible technical explanations regarding the origin of these particles. This unprecedented level of enrichment at 83.7% U-235 constitutes a grave escalation, occurring alongside the concerning accumulation of high-enriched uranium up to 60% and Iran’s ongoing expansion of enrichment capabilities. There is no credible civilian justification for such enrichment in Iran. This step, along with Iran’s broader nuclear programme, brings Iran dangerously close to engaging in weapons-related activities and undermines its assertions that its nuclear programme is solely for peaceful purposes. We support the Director General in maintaining regular and comprehensive reporting on this issue.

We also express deep concern regarding the changes made by Iran to the centrifuge configuration at Fordow without prior notification to the IAEA, implemented just hours after the Agency conducted a site inspection on January 16. As confirmed by the IAEA, this action is inconsistent with Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and hampers the Agency’s ability to carry out effective safeguards measures at Iran’s nuclear facilities. Moreover, we would like to reiterate that Iran’s provision of a revised DIQ and facilitation of increased Agency verification activities at FFEP do not fully address our concerns. Iran continues to utilize a configuration that allows for quick production of high-enriched material well beyond 60%, as evidenced by the presence of particles enriched to 83.7%.

The Director General states in his report that Iran’s decision to cease cooperation with the monitoring and verification activities agreed upon in the JCPoA implies that the Agency will no longer be able to re-establish continuity of knowledge, even if a full JCPoA resumption occurs. Iran’s choice to dismantle Agency surveillance and monitoring equipment has detrimental effects on the Agency’s capacity to assure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We call on Iran to reinstall all necessary equipment as determined by the IAEA and to permit monitoring and verification of its nuclear programme as agreed in the JCPoA. It is crucial that Iran timely implements the Joint Statement between the AEOI and the IAEA to allow the IAEA to execute further appropriate verification and monitoring activities. Iran should take the necessary steps to furnish the Agency with information essential for rebuilding continuity of knowledge, which has become increasingly critical given Iran’s escalating actions.

Chair,

The full range of findings in the Director General’s report is alarming: Iran continues its unprecedented and severe nuclear escalation. There is no credible civilian justification in Iran for these actions, which starkly contradict its JCPoA commitments. The presence of HEU particles of uranium enriched up to 83.7% U-235 at Fordow, as reported by the Agency, is a significant escalatory step and raises extremely grave concerns, as does the ongoing accumulation of high-enriched uranium. Iran’s continued nuclear escalation intensifies the scrutiny regarding the motives behind its nuclear programme, which poses a clear threat to both regional and global security.

We strongly support the Director General in maintaining regular and comprehensive reporting on this issue. We deeply regret that Iran did not accept the fair and balanced proposals tabled by the JCPoA Coordinator last March and August but instead chose to intensify its programme. Iran bears full responsibility for this situation. We urge Iran to immediately cease and reverse its nuclear escalation and allow complete transparency with the IAEA by re-applying the Additional Protocol as a vital confidence-building measure. We also recall that under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Iran is legally bound to implement Modified Code 3.1. and cannot unilaterally alter its application or withdraw from it.

Chair,

We will continue consultations with international partners on the best approach to address Iran’s persistent and dangerous nuclear escalation. We request the Director General to keep the Board of Governors informed ahead of the June Board and to provide earlier updates as necessary; we also request that this report be made publicly available.

Thank you.