UK Statement to the OSCE: Russia’s Escalated Attacks on Ukraine’s Vital Infrastructure Reflects Moral Failure.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for bringing us together and for gathering such an exceptional panel of speakers today.

On February 23, the UN General Assembly adopted, with 141 votes in favor, a resolution that condemned “the grave human rights and humanitarian consequences of the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, including the ongoing attacks on critical infrastructure with devastating effects on civilians.” In solidarity with Ukraine, 140 countries “called for an immediate halt to the attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and any deliberate assaults on civilian facilities, including…schools and hospitals.”

When Russia initiated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Putin anticipated a swift victory. Twelve months later, he is finding himself losing the war and resorting to desperate measures. He is recklessly targeting civilian areas and essential national infrastructure throughout the country. Many of these strikes lack military justification—they are intentionally aimed at instilling fear in civilians. By targeting thermal power plants and hydroelectric dams, he seeks to plunge Ukraine’s population into cold and darkness. This occurs despite Russia having participated with others in the UN Security Council two years ago, in April 2021, to adopt Resolution 2573, which demanded that conflict parties adhere to international humanitarian law obligations and protect critical civilian infrastructure for essential services while ensuring the safety of those operating it.

Deputy Minister Demchenkov today highlighted the impact of attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and nuclear facilities, along with Ukraine’s remarkable response. In March of last year, Russia unlawfully took control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, subjecting its staff to horrific conditions and raising the risk of a nuclear disaster. IAEA Director General Grossi emphasized last week the ongoing safety and security threats. The Russian Federation is solely responsible for the “dangerous, precarious, and challenging situation” at the Plant—direct results of its unlawful invasion. This is coming from a purportedly responsible nuclear state. As Director General Grossi indicated, the sound of falling artillery is ever-present. Just last week, a Russian missile struck a residential building in the city, resulting in the deaths of 13 people, including a young child.

In response, the UK has contributed over €4.5 million to support the Agency’s initiatives in Ukraine. We have also intensified our support to assist Ukraine in addressing attacks on its broader energy infrastructure. To date, the UK has provided nearly £80 million in aid, including:

• £10 million to the Energy Community’s Energy Support Fund for emergency equipment;
• A $50 million guarantee to Ukraine’s electricity operator (through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development);
• 856 generators;
• £5 million for civil nuclear safety and security equipment and initiatives;
• £10 million for generators and heaters for Ukraine’s military operations;
• Ongoing support for Ukraine to defend its critical national infrastructure through the provision of air defense capabilities; and
• A G7 coordination mechanism to assist Ukraine in repairing, restoring, and protecting its energy infrastructure.

Furthermore, in June, the UK and Ukraine will co-host the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London, focusing on the role of the private sector in supporting recovery and reconstruction efforts.

Mr. Chair, the damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure has created insecurities that extend far beyond its borders. Today’s discussion highlights our interconnectedness and the risks and vulnerabilities that arise from it.

Domestically, in December, the UK Government released our Resilience Framework. This outlines our commitment to enhance the resilience of our critical national infrastructure (CNI) across both public and private sectors by fostering a better understanding of our risks and interdependencies and developing new standards and assurance processes. By 2030, the UK will:

• Build upon existing resilience standards to establish common yet flexible standards across CNI; and
• Review current regulatory frameworks on resilience to ensure they are up to date. In the highest priority sectors that are not already regulated, and for the highest-risk scenarios, we will consider implementing regulatory standards.

Additionally, we have created a CNI Knowledge Base: a customized mapping tool to identify interdependencies across and within sectors, forming a ‘single source of truth’ for UK CNI and aiding users in collaborating to anticipate, prevent, and respond to risks.

Mr. Chair, Russia’s ongoing violations of international law and its increased targeting of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure reflect moral bankruptcy. It is a cynical and calculated strategy of brutal destruction. And it is a strategy destined to fail.

Thank you.